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Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am extremely thankful to the Executive Council of the Indian History 
Congress for electing me as the President of Modern India section this year. 
I feel deeply honoured to be so associated with this Congress which has 
spearheaded the promotion of scientific, secular and anti-imperialist history 
in this country for over seventy years. This is one reason why Indian 
historiography is one of the most advanced among the erstwhile colonial 
countries. However, this is not to say that the communal and colonial trends 
actively promoted during the colonial period have died out. These trends 
have periodically resurfaced and acquired some influence even after 
independence. There is thus the need to constantly contend with these 
trends so that the civilisational values promoted so painstakingly by our 
national liberation struggle are preserved and furthered.
I have in this address in a small way tried to contribute to this effort by 
questioning the resurgence of the colonial trend in the writing of economic 
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history of the colonial period.  Paradoxically, it was in the sphere of the 
economic impact of colonialism that colonialism was first critiqued 
effectively. Also, the economic critique of colonialism, relative to other 
critiques of colonialism, was the first to be widely accepted. Yet the colonial 
point of view in this area has again resurfaced, as for example in the recent 
work of Tirthankar Roy. I will very briefly go over the broad contours of 
some of the thinking on colonialism and its economic impact since the mid 
th
19  century and then focus on a critique of how colonialism in its last phase 
has been perceived by historians with a colonial perspective.
I may add that I feel humbled at occupying this position, the sectional 
president-ship of the Congress, which has been held by my teachers and 
mentors some of whom are present here today. 
I
th
The 19  century saw a rich debate on the impact of colonialism on the 
colony. Two journalistic pieces written by Karl Marx in 1853 for the New 
York Daily Tribune on British rule in India raised some key issues 
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concerned with this debate which are of relevance even today.   Marx in 
these articles wrote about the “destructive” and the “regenerative” role of 
colonialism. He saw in the very process of destruction by colonialism of 
the pre-colonial Indian society, the regenerative   role of colonialism, as it 
opened up the possibility of growth of capitalism and industrialisation in 
the colony. This was because Marx,  on the basis of information then 
available to him, erroneously characterized Indian society as a 'changeless' 
'Asiatic society' which needed to be destroyed, even though the process 
was painful, before  any social progress could occur. Further, along with 
the destruction of the old 'Asiatic' order he expected that new elements 
introduced by British rule, such as electric telegraph, railways, steam 
navigation, private property in land, western education, free press, political 
unification, etc., would create the conditions for the evolution of a modern 
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western type of society. As he put it:
England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other 
regenerating - the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material 
foundations of Western society in India.
The hope was that colonialism would lead to the 'mirror image' of 
capitalism being produced in the colony.  This position of Marx led to much 
4
controversy and misuse  subsequently. This was because Marx's overall 
position in these articles and especially his position as it emerged shortly 
after writing these articles in the enormous corpus of work produced by him 
5
was not fully appreciated.
Before one looks at the complex position taken by Marx over time it is 
significant to note that the modern Indian intelligentsia in the first half of the 
th
19  century had a perspective similar to that which Marx was to state later in 
his 1853 articles. For instance, Raja Rammohan Roy, the father of Modern 
India, described British rule as the gift of divine providence not because he 
was comprador or a lackey of the British but because he saw British rule as 
1
 I must at the outset acknowledge my debt to the Delhi Historians' Group. I have over the years been a 
beneficiary of the comraderie, academic and otherwise, of this group. I will particularly like to thank 
Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, Salil Mishra, Tadd Fernee, Rakesh Batabyal, 
Mahalakshmi, Vishalakshi Menon, Bhupendra Yadav, Shin Minha, Medha And Gyanesh Kudaisya, 
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 'The British Rule in India' and 'The Future Results of the British Rule in India' New York Daily Tribune, 
25 June and 8 August 1853. Marx's writings on India in this newspaper along with articles written by 
Frederick Engels as well as relevant extracts from Marx-Engels Correspondence 1853-62 have been 
compiled in an extremely useful volume edited by Iqbal Hussain, Karl Marx on India, Tulika, 2006. The 
volume also contains contributions by Irfan Habib, “Introduction: Marx's Perception of India” and  
Prabhat Patnaik, “Appreciation: The  Other Marx,”  which analyse and  explain Marx's position and 
thus increase the value of the volume immensely. 
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New York Daily Tribune, 8 August 1853, in Iqbal Husain, ed., Karl Marx on India, p. 46.
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Pro-imperialist scholars like Morris D. Morris have sought a defence of colonialism through Marx's 
remarks. See for example his “Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth Century Indian Economic 
History” in Indian Economy in the Nineteenth Century: A Symposium, Delhi, 1969, p.3. Even within the 
Left, works such as those of Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, New Left Books, 1980, 
have made a mockery of Marx's position. Writing decades after the role of Imperialism had been laid 
bare, Warren critiqued the anti-imperialist position, arguing that imperialism actually led to the growth 
of capitalism. (Marx in the 1853 articles had suggested this only as a possibility. More on this below). 
Warren is somewhat on stronger ground in his critique of some of the Dependency school's positions 
which tended to equate imperialism with the world market and which by definition excluded the 
possibility of any non-dependent capitalist third world progress. Ibid. p. 160 .
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For a detailed discussion and analysis of Marx's position on India, see Bipan Chandra, “Karl Marx, his 
Theories of Asian Societies and  Colonial Rule”, Mimeo., CHS, JNU and  in  Sociological Theories: 
Race and Colonialism, UNESCO, 1980, an abbreviated version in Review, 1, Summer 1981. Also see 
Irfan Habib, “Marx's Perception of India” cited in footnote 1 and also in  Irfan  Habib, Essays in Indian 
History: Towards a Marxist Perception, Tulika, New Delhi, 1995.
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creating the conditions for the modernization of the Indian economy, polity, 
etc., much in the manner reflected in the position taken by Marx. It appeared 
to be the wisdom of the time.  Indeed, it is for this reason that the Indian 
modern intelligentsia did not support the 1857 revolt against the British, 
which they feared would lead to a throwback to the pre-colonial order. 
Marx, too, had doubts about the progressive potential of the revolt.
However the Indian intelligentsia was to soon (by the late 1860s) 
th
abandon this position and over the second half of the 19  century began to 
see colonialism not as the harbinger of or route to capitalist modernization 
but as the chief obstacle to the transition to capitalism in India, an 
understanding which was to lead them to demand the overthrow of British 
rule. In fact, the Indian early nationalists were among the first in the world, 
decades before Hobson, Lenin or Rosa Luxemburg, to evolve a multi-
pronged, detailed and sophisticated critique of colonialism. The remarkable 
achievement of the Indian early nationalists in this respect is perhaps still 
not adequately appreciated among scholars in India and remains virtually 
ignored globally despite the definitive and monumental work on the early 
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nationalists produced by Prof. Bipan Chandra as early as the 1960s.
In the context of the change in perception of the Indian intelligentsia 
regarding British rule it is very important to look at Marx's 1853 position 
carefully and particularly to note how it evolved over time. (It would be 
interesting to investigate evidence of one being influenced by the other as 
their thinking on several aspects moved on similar lines). It must be noted 
that when Marx talked of the 'regenerative' role of British rule he was 
conscious that only the conditions of regeneration were being created under 
British rule and not regeneration itself. He was talking of a potential which 
had not yet emerged from the ruin brought on by British rule which he often 
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described so graphically.  He wrote, in June 1853:
England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any 
symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing. This loss of his old world, with no gain of  a 
new one imparts a particular kind of melancholy to the present misery of the Hindoo 
and separates Hindostan, ruled by Britain, … from the whole of its past history.
 In fact a few months later in his August 1853 article where he talked of 
the “destructive” and “regenerative” role he was still talking of England 
having to “fulfill” this “double mission” in India (i.e., it was yet to happen) 
so that certain “new elements” were introduced in Indian society which 
would enable it to move on the path of social progress. However, Marx with 
remarkable prescience (much before the modern National liberation 
struggle in India took root) was simultaneously anticipating the need for the 
overthrow of colonialism if India was to actually reap the benefits of the 
9
“new elements” that British colonialism was to engender. As he put it:
The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them 
by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the new ruling classes shall have 
been supplanted  by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindus themselves shall have 
grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether.
Marx suggests that British rule, or the onslaught of British capitalism 
on the Indian colony would “neither emancipate nor materially mend the 
social condition of the mass of the people”, which would depend on “not 
only the development of productive powers, but of their appropriation by 
the people” presumably possible only with the overthrow of British rule. 
Yet he says “what they (British rulers) will not fail to do is lay down the 
material premises for both” albeit at the cost of “dragging …people through 
10
blood and dirt, through misery and degradation”.
The question still remains that while Indians may not have been able to 
reap the fruits of the “new elements” that would lead to the “development of 
productive powers” till it achieved national liberation but did British rule 
create the “the material premises” for both the processes so that one could 
“safely expect to see, at a more or less remote period, the regeneration of 
11
that great and interesting country”,  India? That colonialism would create 
the conditions for its overthrow is understandable but did it lay the “material 
foundations” for the development of productive powers?
The answer to this question assumes importance not only to decide 
what view to take of colonialism as a whole but also in explaining certain 
positive developments in the late colonial period (in India) and particularly 
after the overthrow of colonialism. As we shall see later it would involve 
seeing these developments either as the result of colonialism, though much 
restricted or delayed by it, or as a result of the break from colonialism. The 
central theme of this address will be to argue the latter.
It appears to me that Marx began very quickly to distance himself from 
the position that colonialism, however “swinish”, would introduce 
elements which would lead to the growth of productive powers and 
capitalism in the colony.
6
 See Bipan Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism In India,, New Delhi, 1966
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 Bipan Chandra, “Karl Marx, his Theories of Asian Societies and  Colonial Rule”, Mimeo, 1980, pp. 36, 
41, has emphasised this aspect of Marx seeing the regeneration as a future potential. .
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New York Daily Tribune, 25 June, 1853, in Iqbal Husain, ed., Karl Marx on India, p.12, emphasis mine.     
9 
New York Daily Tribune, 8 August 1853, in Iqbal Husain, ed., Karl Marx on India, p.49, emphasis mine. 
In fact a few years later Marx was to see the emancipation of the British working class following the 
emancipation of the colonial people. In 1869, while commenting on the Irish colonial situation, Marx 
argued that a “national  revolution in Ireland was a precondition for a successful revolution in Britain” 
See Bipan Chandra, “Karl Marx, his Theories of Asian Societies and  Colonial Rule”, Mimeo, p.58.
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New York Daily Tribune, 8 August 1853, in Iqbal Husain, ed., Karl Marx on India, p.49, emphasis 
mine.
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Ibid., emphasis mine.
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It is significant that Marx never used the characterization of the 
'regenerative' effect of colonialism after his August 1853 article, not even in 
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articles written later that year.  He clearly was moving towards a different 
position on colonialism especially after he and Engels studied a concrete 
colonial situation closely, that of Ireland. In fact, in his later writings, 
including in Capital Vol. 1 (1867), he began to emphasise the destructive 
role of colonialism and identify some of the key structural features which 
the capitalism-colonialism interface was leading to which were not 
conducive to the growth of capitalism in the colony though it helped the 
growth of capitalism in the metropolis or the colonising country. He clearly 
saw the unrequited transfer of capital from the colony to the metropolis in 
various forms, what the early nationalists called the 'drain', as a “bleeding 
process” ruinous to the colony but critical to the process of primitive 
accumulation and therefore to the transition to and growth of industrial 
capitalism in the metropolitan countries. He now saw the Railways as 
“useless to the Hindus”, and therefore counted the dividend paid for the 
railways, like the military and civilian expenses which involved 
remittances out of India, as all constituting part of the drain or the “bleeding 
process”.
He notes that an unequal international division of labour was emerging, 
“a division suited to the requirements of the chief centres of modern 
industry” converting “one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field 
of production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly 
industrial field”. As is well known, the Ricardian theory of comparative 
advantage was used to perpetuate this division of labour, a division which 
led to growing productivity differences between the industrialised and non-
industrialised societies. Marx was perhaps the first to be able to see that 
apart from the fact that British industry benefited from the denial of 
industrial development to India there was a not so obvious surplus 
appropriation in favour of Britain involved in the trade between the two 
countries even in this so called free trade as opposed to the monopoly trade 
or trade involving non-economic coercion typical of the earlier mercantile 
phase of colonialism. He saw the 'unequal exchange' involved in trade 
between countries with different productivity levels with the high 
productivity country exchanging commodities with less labour input for 
commodities from the low productivity country which had a much higher 
labour input, though the commodities exchanged had the same 
13
monetary/market value.  The process of keeping India un-industrialised 
benefited British industry but simultaneously strengthened the process of 
surplus appropriation through “unequal exchange”. Each process 
reinforced the other.
British agrarian policies were also no longer seen by Marx as producing 
private property in land but “caricatures” of it.  He no longer saw the 
potential of capitalism emerging in agriculture in these societies through 
this intervention.
Here we see seeds of the understanding that the “new elements” that 
emerged as a result of the impact of colonialism, because they came in a 
colonial form, they were incapable of having a regenerative effect on the 
colony. Hence Marx increasingly emphasised the necessity of the 
overthrow of colonialism, a position taken further within the Marxist 
tradition by Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and others.
The critique of colonialism was sophisticated further in many 
dimensions as the later stages of colonialism unfolded themselves and their 
impact could be studied. Major advances were made in analyzing the 
political economy of colonialism after the Second World War with the 
writings of Paul Baran and Balandier in the 1950s and later, in the late 1960s 
and 1970s by the Dependency theorists, neo-Marxist world system analysts 
and others like Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Nicos Poulantzas, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, Ernesto Laclau, Hamza Alavi and Bipan Chandra, to name just 
a few.
[Since the early 1980s however, an alternate motley stream occupied by 
post modernism, 'post-colonial' culture studies, subaltern studies, etc., has 
partially (and I hope temporarily) hijacked (fortunately as yet essentially 
among sections of first world academia) the mainstream debate on the 
political economy of imperialism. The focus has shifted from the political 
economy of imperialism to its 'representation'. The nationalist response, 
including of massive long drawn popular movements, is also characterised 
(and thus virtually dismissed) as either being part of the 'colonial discourse' 
or 'elite' or 'official'! This setback to the study of colonialism and 
nationalism has paradoxically occurred through scholarly intervention in 
the name of the 'people', the oppressed without a 'voice', by scholars who, 
largely have, at least in the Indian case, shifted base to the First World or 
appear to aspire to do so. As Arif Dirlik asks: “When exactly…does the 
post-colonial begin?” and goes on to answer, “When Third World 
intellectuals have arrived in First world academe.” A critique of this stream, 
12 
This is a point emphasized by Bipan Chandra.  For all references to Marx's writing after the August 
1853 article, I am basing myself on Bipan Chandra, “Karl Marx, his Theories of Asian Societies and  
Colonial Rule”, Mimeo and Irfan Habib, “Introduction: Marx's Perception of India” in Iqbal Hussain, 
Karl Marx on India, Tulika, 2006.
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and by Indian business leaders since the mid 1930s. See Bipan Chandra, “Colonial India: British versus 
Indian Views of Development”, Review, A Journal of  Fernand Braudel Center, Vol XIV, No.1, Winter 
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however, is outside the scope of this address.]
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Bipan Chandra in his seminal work “Colonialism and Modernisation”  
delivered as a presidential address to this very Congress in 1970, thirty 
seven years ago, argued that colonialism did not lead to capitalist 
modernization, neither did it create certain conditions in that direction, i.e., 
it was not as if it led to 'partial' or 'restricted' modernization or that it had 
some “residual” benefits, despite the overall exploitative character, which 
could be of some advantage after independence. He, along with 
HamzaAlavi, made a strong plea for seeing colonialism neither as semi-
capitalist or backward capitalist nor as an amalgam of 'traditional' pre-
capitalist and 'modern' capitalist features but as a distinct colonial 
16
structure.    As Bipan Chandra put it, colonialism “is a well-structured 
'whole', a distinct social formation (system) or sub-formation (sub-system) 
in which the basic control of the economy and society is in the hands of a 
foreign capitalist class which functions in the colony (or semi-colony) 
through a dependent and subservient economic, social, political, and 
intellectual structure whose forms can vary with the changing conditions of 
the historical development of capitalism as a world-wide system.” Further 
he argued that the new colonial social framework that came into being 
which included “not only the economy but also the patterns of social, 
political, administrative and cultural life….was stagnant and decaying as it 
17
was being born”, i.e., had no 'regenerative' potential.
Many of the features that a colonial economy demonstrated, though 
they appeared to be capitalist, within the colonial framework, they 
performed completely different and distinctly colonial roles. For example, a 
colonial situation could witness, as it did in India, a high degree of 
commercialization (or generalized commodity production), rapid growth in 
transport and communications, close integration with the world market and 
a high degree of 'potential investible surplus' raised from within the 
economy - all features associated with capitalist development. Yet in the 
colonial context all these development led to capitalist development in the 
metropolis but further colonial structuring in the colony. It ended up, to use 
Tilak’s expressive phrase, “decorating another’s wife”, and one may add, 
while disfiguring one’s own.
In the Indian colonial economy, which was forcibly internally 
disarticulated and extroverted, the above changes did not stimulate internal 
inter-sectoral exchanges between Indian agriculture and Indian industry, or 
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between Indian consumer goods industry and capital goods industry.  The 
circuit of commodity circulation was completed via the metropolis where 
colonial agriculture was linked to metropolitan industry, or colonial 
consumer goods industry (if and when it was allowed to develop) with 
metropolitan capital goods industry; the multiplier effects of these 
exchanges were thus transmitted abroad. Similarly, the surplus generated in 
the colonial economy did not lead to extended reproduction through 
investment (the key feature which distinguishes capitalism from pre-
capitalist modes of production) thus raising the organic composition of 
capital and productivity to a higher level on a significant scale within the 
19
indigenous economy, but facilitated this process in the metropolis.  
20
Traditional artisanal industry was destroyed,  (i.e., a process of de-
industrialization occurred in a country which was the world's largest 
exporter of textiles in the pre-colonial era) and not replaced with modern 
capital intensive industry on a significant scale.
14 
For a useful collection on imperialism see Peter J. Cain and Mark Harrison, ed., Imperialism: Critical 
Concepts in Historical Studies, Routledge, London, 2001, 3 volumes. The Introduction to this series 
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surveys the material from the 19  century till the late 20  century. Another useful article included in this 
collection, Patrick Wolfe, “History and Imperialism: A century of Theory from Marx to 
Postcolonialism”, also critically surveys the literature. The Arif Dirlik quotation is from this article. For 
an important and detailed critique of  the treatment of nationalism and popular resistance to colonialism 
by the 'subaltern studies' and associated scholarship see Mridula Mukherjee, Peasants in India's Non-
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Interrogating Peasant Historiography: Peasant Perspectives, Marxist Practice and Subaltern Theory.  
Also see Mridula Mukherjee, “Peasant Resistance and Peasant Consciousness in Colonial India: 
'Subalterns' and Beyond”, Economic and Political Weekly, (hereafter EPW), 8 and 15 October, 1988. 
The 'subalterns', to my knowledge, have not responded to this critique.
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See Bipan Chandra, “Colonialism and Modernisation”, 1970, Ibid., and “Colonialism, Stages of 
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Hamza Alavi, et.al., Capitalism and Colonial Production, London and Canberra, 1982. See also Jairas 
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critical transfers from the colony were to the process of capital accumulation for Britain and how 
debilitating it was for the colony. See Irfan Habib, “Colonisation of the Indian Economy”, in Essays in 
Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception, Tulika, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 304-6, Sayera Habib, 
“Colonial Exploitation and Capital Formation in England in the Early Stages of Industrial Revolution”, 
Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Aligarh, 1975, Utsa Patnaik, “New Estimates of 
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In some cases even existing modern industry was destroyed, witness the destruction of the textile, 
7 8
Capitalism did not grow in agriculture either. Commodity production in 
agriculture was in response to a “forced commercialization” to primarily 
meet the colonial state's revenue demands and not with a capitalist 
rationality, i.e., to earn profit for investment. Typically, agriculture 
witnessed a high degree of differentiation but it did not lead to capitalist 
farming through extended reproduction. The petty mode of production was 
perpetuated in agriculture with the large estates being let out to tenants with 
small holdings who continued to cultivate at more or less the same 
21
traditional levels of technology.  Moreover, agricultural output and 
22
exports, even when they grew,  they remained articulated with 
metropolitan industrial and other needs.
The basic point was that colonialism had to be viewed and evaluated as 
an overall structure. Growth in one or the other sector of the economy or 
society could not be evaluated as 'partial' development (to be offset against 
the lack of such growth in another sector) if that sectoral growth was 
instrumental in creating the colonial structuring which led to overall 
stagnation and even decline. This was an understanding arrived at by Marx 
and Engels in their study of the Irish colonial situation as it was by the early 
23
nationalists in the case of India.  The development of railways, foreign 
trade, telegraph, agrarian transformation, a colonial civil service, etc., 
occurred in a manner that they became critical instruments in converting the 
24
pre-capitalist and sometimes emerging capitalist societies  into a stillborn 
colonial structure. The very instruments of the subversion of modern 
capitalist development in favour of colonial structuring cannot be  treated 
as the 'residual' or 'partial' benefits of colonialism, a fallacy which 
unfortunately creeps into the thought of otherwise staunch liberal 
nationalists at the highest level and even some Marxists. The opportunity 
cost of failing to use the same resources, (which created the instruments for 
colonial purposes) alternatively, often over centuries of colonial 
domination and of having to undo the colonial structuring after freedom 
was won, is mind boggling.
If colonialism was not leading to 'partial' modernization, if it was not 
'transitional' to modernization, but was structuring-in backwardness, then 
moving temporally further on the colonial path would not bring the colony 
25
closer to modernization. Only a break from it would.  The colonial path and 
the capitalist path are not even like parallel paths which do not ever meet, 
26
they are actually divergent paths.  The more a society moved on the 
colonial path the more the colonial distortions would be structured-in and 
the more difficult it would be to make the transition to independent 
capitalist or for that matter socialist development. The 'built-in depressors', 
to use an apt term attributed to Daniel Thorner, that colonialism created 
would get heavier and the task of independent development that much more 
challenging.
It was not only the task of un-structuring the colonial economic 
structure which was the challenge before the countries politically liberated 
from colonialism. The task of 'de-colonizing' the non-economic institutions 
spawned by colonialism like the colonial bureaucracy, judiciary, police, 
education system, etc., were to prove equally daunting. Sixty years after 
independence, India is still struggling to decolonize these institutions. As 
we will see later we still have textbooks taught in our schools and major 
universities such as the recent Oxford Economic History of India by 
27
Tirthankar Roy,  which argues a blatant colonial position which would 
have embarrassed many British Governor-Generals and Viceroys. While it 
is understandable that Niall Ferguson, the no-holds-barred open defender of 
British imperialism, should find Roy's work praiseworthy; what is 
surprising is that scholars such as Ramachandra Guha and Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam, whom one would not suspect of harbouring colonial 
28
sentiments, echo that view.  Decolonization of the mind is indeed a long 
and tortuous process.
shipbuilding and armament industry, started by Mohd. Ali in Egypt in the 1830s, through colonial 
intervention. See for example V. Lutsky, Modern History of the Arab Countries, Progress Publishers, 
Moscow, 1969. 
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This tendency has been shown to be true even in areas like Punjab in India, which it has been wrongly 
claimed was moving in the direction of capitalist agriculture, by Mridula Mukherjee, Colonialising 
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Journal of  Fernand Braudel Center, Vol XIV, No.1, Winter 1991, p. 87.
24 
Mohammad Ali's Egypt for example.
25 
Bipan Chandra was the first to empirically demonstrate for India (as Gunder Frank had shown for 
Latin America) that the spurts of industrial growth that India witnessed during the last phase of 
colonialism from 1914 to 1947 was a result of the “loosening of the links” or breaks with colonialism 
rather than because of it. See his “Colonialism and Modernization”, op.cit. More on this later.
26 
Those who argue that colonialism was leading to partial modernization or that it was transitional to 
modernization would have to accept that moving further on the colonial path would in fact bring the 
country closer to capitalist development, a position even the die hard imperialists would find difficult to 
argue. 
27 
Tirthankar Roy, The Economic History of India:1857-1947,  Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 
2000, Second edition, 2006. All references in this address are to the first edition.
28 
See Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, Penguin, London, 2003, for an 
unabashed defence of the empire. Praise of Tirthankar Roy's work  by Ferguson, Guha and 
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II
The colonial argument has a long ancestry. Being the argument 
emanating from the more 'successful'/rich and powerful part of the globe, 
even though it was the argument of the ruling elite, it found takers among 
the oppressed as well. Its influence varied depending on the intellectual and 
political strength of the anti-imperialist movement at different points of 
time.
th
Since the 19  century British colonial officials as well as some 
intellectuals put up a spirited defense of colonialism. They argued that 
British colonialism brought law and order and modern transport and 
communications, led to growth of foreign trade and integrated the colony 
with the global market, brought in resources to India through British 
investments (drain was persistently denied), made major changes in 
property rights in agriculture and improved irrigation, all factors leading to 
29
unprecedented economic development in India.  The “white man's burden” 
or the “civilizing mission” did not end there. Indians had to be retrieved 
from their 'barbaric' and 'hideous' conditions through gradually training 
them for self government as well! Further, the inhibiting factors in Indian 
development were, it was argued, over-population, shortage of capital, 
Indian social customs, social institutions, values and habits like lack of 
ambition, apathy, thriftlessness, spending extravagantly on marriages, and 
also India's geographical weaknesses and climatic conditions. The 
negatives, in other words, involved looking within and not at colonialism.
The early Indian nationalists, consisting of some of the best minds of 
that era, over nearly half a century of intense intellectual activity, 
questioned each one of the colonial claims and, as I pointed out earlier, 
created a sophisticated critique of imperialism. Through books based on 
years of research, articles, newspapers, legislative assemblies, the British 
parliament, public meetings and numerous such forums they argued their 
position. Their success was that the essential elements of their thought 
became the common sense wisdom of the time and provided the basic 
structure of the economic understanding of colonialism not only to the 
Indian national movement but to the planners and academics after 
independence. 
A major resurgence of the colonial position regarding the Indian 
experience of colonialism occurred in academia with the writings of Morris 
30
D. Morris in the early 1960s,  and the publication of the voluminous 
31
Cambridge Economic History Vol. 2 in the early 1980s.  A robust challenge 
32
emerged with Bipan Chandra, Toru Matsui, Tapan Raychaudhuri,  Irfan 
33
Habib,  and others writing detailed critiques and by a number of research 
works such as that of A. K. Bannerji, Basudev Chatterji, Sunanda Sen, 
Michael Kidron, George Blyn, Utsa Patnaik, S. Sivasubramonian, R.W. 
34
Goldsmith,  A.I. Levkovsky, V.B. Singh, Debdas Bannerjee  (to name just a 
35
few) and the seminal work of A. K.  Bagchi.  The colonial position on the 
economic front however continued, particularly regarding an interpretation 
th 36
of the 18  century, leading to an interesting debate.
However, while most of the pro-colonial works since independence 
reiterated the colonial position regarding only some aspects of the economy 
the recent work of Tirthankar Roy, The Economic History of India, 
mentioned above, tries to present, somewhat in a 'made easy' style, the 
Subrahmanyam are quoted in the second edition of Roy's book, ibid,. as an advertisement for the book.
29 
Bipan Chandra has in considerable detail given the British and Indian ideas on colonialism and the 
issue of development in India in, “Colonial India: British versus Indian Views of Development”, 
Review, A Journal of  Fernand Braudel Center, Vol XIV, No.1, Winter 1991 and “British and Indian Ideas 
on Indian Economic Development, 1858-1905” in his Nationalism and Colonialism…,op.cit.
30 
See Morris D. Morris, “Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth Century Indian Economic History,” 
Journal of Economic History, Vol.XXIII, No. 4, 1963.
31 
Dharma Kumar, ed., Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1982.
32 
Morris D. Morris's 1963 article in Journal of Economic History and responses to it by Bipan Chandra, 
Toru Matsui, Tapan Raychaudhuri and Morris's rejoinder all in Indian Economic and Social History 
Review (IESHR) were compiled and published as Indian Economy in the nineteenth Century: A 
Symposium, IESHR, Delhi, 1969.
33 
See Irfan Habib, “Colonization of the Indian Economy 1757-1900”, Social Scientist, Vol. 3, No. 8, 
March 1975 and “Studying a Colonial Economy Without Perceiving Colonialism”,  Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3,  !985, both reproduced in Irfan Habib, Essays in Indian History: Towards a 
Marxist Perspective, Tulika, New Delhi, 1995.
34 
Bannerji, A.K., India's Balance of Payments: Estimates of Current and Capital Accounts from 1921-
22 to 1938-39, Bombay, 1963 and Aspects of Indo-British Economic Relations, 1858-1898, OUP, 
Bombay, 1982; Basudev Chatterji, Trade, Tariffs and Empire: Lancashire and British Policy in India 
1919-1939, OUP, Delhi, 1992; Sunanda Sen, Colonies and the Empire: India 1890-1914, Orient 
Longman, Calcutta, 1992; Michael Kidron, Foreign Investment in India, London, 1965; George Blyn, 
Agricultural Trends in India, 1891-1947: Output, Availability, and Productivity, Philadelphia, 1966; 
Utsa Patnaik, Essays on Political Economy: The Long Transition,  Tulika, New Delhi, 1999,; S. 
Sivasubramonian, The National Income of India in the Twentieth Century, OUP, New Delhi, 2000; R.W. 
Goldsmith, The Financial Development of India, 1860-1977, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1983; 
A.I. Levkovsky, Capitalism in India, Delhi, 1966; V.B.Singh, ed., The Economic History of India, 
Bombay, 1965 contains a series of articles questioning the colonial view; Debdas Bannerjee, 
Colonialism in Action: Trade, Development and Dependence in Late Colonial India, New Delhi, 1999.
35 
See Private Investment in India,1900-1939, Cambridge, 1972 and Perilous Passage : Mankind and 
the Global Ascendancy of Capital, OUP, New Delhi, 2006. See also his The Political Economy of 
Underdevelopment, Cambridge, 1982. I have some serious differences however with Bagchi's treatment 
of some aspects of the last phase of colonialism and especially of his characterization of post colonial 
India as “neo-colonial” in this work. See, for example, Aditya Mukherjee and Mridula Mukherjee, 
“Imperialism and the Growth of Indian Capitalism in the Twentieth Century”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 12 March 1988 and Aditya Mukherjee, Imperialism Nationalism and the Making of the Indian 
Capitalist Class: 1920-1947, Sage, New Delhi, 2002. See also f.n. 45 below.
36 
See Irfan Habib, “The Eighteenth Century in Indian Economic History”, in Leonard Blusse and 
Femme Gaastra, ed., On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History Van Leur in Retrospect, 
th
Ashgate, Hampshire, 1998 for a critique of positions taken by people like Chris Bailey and others on 18  
Century India. 
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colonial position in its entirety covering all aspects of the colonial economy. 
Roy laments that in the “average Indian's sense of history”, “colonialism” 
was seen as “responsible ... for … underdevelopment”. (The 'guilt' of the 
early nationalists in creating this 'sense' is evident).  He wants us to “take 
37
leave of (such) generalizations” and “step into history” , a history which 
then he proceeds to outline, doing little better than sketch the average 
colonialist's sense of history. It is not possible to do here a detailed critique 
of Roy's work as it would involve going over the entire colonial position. He 
has reiterated almost all the arguments of the British civil servants and 
Viceroys about the benefits of British rule and the causes of lack of growth 
in India that are summarized above and has ignored or summarily dismissed 
the rich anti-colonial discourse that evolved over more than a century. 
38
(Given below in the footnote are some examples of Roy's position.)  I shall 
in this address limit myself to a more modest and limited task.
III
This address will focus on the last phase of colonialism in India 
39
particularly since the First World War.  The period saw some growth of 
indigenous industry and a substantial growth of the indigenous capitalist 
class. Apart from this the period witnessed several other 'positive' 
developments which diverge from the classical colonial pattern that had got 
established in India. This has led to one group of colonial writers seeing 
40
these as the result of colonialism and its policies,  which created conditions 
41
for rapid economic advance later.  Morris D. Morris too sees the period 
after 1914 as one during which “rather substantial structural modifications 
occurred” when “the base was laid for a renewed upward surge after 
independence”; unfortunately, despite all the “growth benefits of 
nineteenth century” the “nineteenth century as a period was too brief to 
achieve all the structural changes needed to provide the preconditions for an 
42
industrial revolution.”  The implication in their writings is that the impetus 
of the changes during 1914-1947 remained colonial and post Independence 
India could just build on them, without involving any fundamental break 
from colonialism. Other colonial scholars see this period as one of 
'decolonization' where colonialism was gradually pulling out, handing over 
43 
to Indian interests. Some even see this period as one where England was 
44  45
being exploited by India! I shall question this range of colonial views.
37 
The Economic History of India, op. cit., Introduction, p.18.  
38 
Here are just a few samples of Roy's position selected from various parts of the book which he himself 
calls “no more than an updated and shorter version of the Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol.II.” 
He argues:  (i) “…Colonial India experienced positive economic growth…. In the nineteenth century 
…it was driven by India's integration in a rapidly growing world market …. Other key factors 
encouraging economic growth …were a strong state and modern transport and communication.” “Real 
income in industry and services grew rapidly throughout the colonial rule.” (ii) “The notion that 
commercialization was forced upon the peasants by taxes or debt, and not driven by profit motive, is 
seriously disputable.” (iii) The proverbial “indebtedness” of the peasantry could be “a sign of prosperity 
and not poverty of the peasants” (iv) “Drain of resources from India can neither be precisely defined nor 
correctly measured”. In any case “economic gains from colonies were neither as large as was imagined 
nor as crucial to the origins of industrialization.” (v) The 'de-industrialization' thesis is unsatisfactory 
and needs to be replaced by an “alternative story” that of “commercialization” (vi) “The most important 
legacy of British rule was modern infrastructure and public goods that it created….assets India could not 
believably have acquired in such extent and quality had it not developed close political links with 
Britain,” i.e., British rule was necessary for India's transition to modernity. (vii) The modernity, if not 
benevolence, of the colonial state was also seen from the fact that “it spent less on luxuries and more on 
the genuine  duties of the state such as defence, welfare, infrastructure and institutions.” (Viii) “Any 
explanation of slow growth rates must focus on the role of local characteristics and peculiarities…” 
Rather than hold colonialism responsible for stagnation one had to look at “conditions within India” 
such as: (a) “scarcity of water” despite investments made by the British which “go to the credit of this 
(British) regime”; (b) “scarcity of capital was always present and always acute”; (c) accelerated 
population growth rates; (d) social institutions like “caste…introduced market imperfections”; (e) the 
Indians' “hunger for gold and silver” and inclination “to spend the extra income on sumptuous marriage 
feasts and jewelry rather than on irrigation or road building”; (f) “agriculture…was subject to high 
climatic risks”; (g) “ poorly developed institutions… such as banks and insurance ,” etc.  The Economic 
History of India…op.cit., Pp.vi,14-18, 91, 130, 217, 240-43, 257, 273, 310-11, emphasis mine. 
39  
In this section I have drawn heavily from Aditya Mukherjee, “The Indian Capitalist Class: Aspects of 
its Economic, Political and Ideological Development in the Colonial Period, 1927-47”, paper read at 
Indian History Congress, Kurukshetra, 1982 and reprinted in S. Bhattacharya and Romila Thapar, eds., 
Situating Indian History, OUP, Delhi, 1986 and Aditya Mukherjee, Imperialism Nationalism and the 
Making of the Indian Capitalist Class: 1920-1947, Sage, New Delhi, 2002.
40 
Tirthankar Roy,  op.cit., particularly Ch. 4 and 5.
41 
A.D.D. Gordon, Businessmen and Politics: Rising Nationalism and a Modernising Economy in 
Bombay, 1918-1933, Manohar, New Delhi, Vera Anstey,  The Economic Development of India, London, 
1957 and Tirthankar Roy, op.cit., see for example, pp. 51, 116-17, 136-7, 152-3, etc.
42
 See Indian Economy in the Nineteenth Century: A Symposium, Delhi, 1969, pp. 13-15, emphasis 
th
mine. Shockingly, Morris is writing about the 19  century being too brief, in 1963, when independent 
India, making genuine structural changes was already beginning to change the industrial landscape of 
the country in less than 15 years of planning. See for example Aditya Mukherjee, “Indian Economy, 
1947-65: The Nehruvian Legacy”, in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee, India 
After Independence- 1947-2000,  Penguin, 2000, revised and enlarged edition called India Since 
Independence, (in press).
43 
See, Clive Dewey, “The End of Imperialism of Free Trade: The Eclipse of the Lancashire Lobby and 
the Commission of Fiscal Autonomy to India”, in Clive Dewey and A.G. Hopkins, eds., Imperial 
Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India, London, 1978 and “The Government of 
India's New Industrial Policy 1900-1925”, in Clive Dewey and K.N. Chaudhuri, eds., Economy and 
Society, Essays in Indian Economic and Social History, Delhi, 1979; and A.D.D. Gordon, op.cit.
44 
Drummond, I. M., British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919-1939, London, 1972.
45
 I shall not discuss here the “Left” variant of the decolonization thesis which was argued initially in the 
late 1920s to explain this period seeing it as one where imperialism continued in an altered form 
encouraging industrialization and therefore the colonial bourgeoisie had no basic contradictions with it. 
See Aditya Mukherjee, “The Workers' and Peasant s' Parties, 1926-30: An Aspect of Communism in 
India”, Studies in History, III, 1&2, 1981, reprinted in Bipan Chandra, ed., The Indian Left: Critical 
Appraisals, New Delhi, 1983, for a brief summary of the communist view.  See, also, Sobhanlal Datta 
Gupta, Comintern, India and the Colonial Question, 1920-1937, Calcutta, 1980. A. K. Bagchi has 
continued to argue a similar position, which has persisted in a section of the Indian Left, adding that this 
period only “exchanged a state of unilateral dependence on Britain for that of multilateral dependence  
on the advanced capitalist countries” setting the stage for a “neocolonial, retarded society” after 1947. 
The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 90-94. See also, A.K. Bagchi, 
“Foreign Capital and Economic Development in India; A Schematic View”, in K. Gough and H.P. 
Sharma, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, New York, 1973. I have critiqued this view 
extensively elsewhere (see f.n. 35 above). 
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the twenties, got a major push in the thirties and during the Second World 
War, and took a quantum leap at a qualitatively different level in the years 
following independence. In any case, by 1939, India was more or less self-
47
sufficient in her major consumer goods requirements.  Most important, the 
bulk of this process was occurring under the aegis of independent 
indigenous capital.
Second, apart from import substitution, there was a growing tendency 
towards inward orientation, with indigenous producers, who were earlier 
producing for export, shifting towards the home market. Also, the link 
between agriculture and indigenous industry began to grow, reversing the 
earlier trend where the former was increasingly linked to metropolitan 
 
industry. A good exampleof this process was the cotton textile industry, the 
most important industry in India at that time. In the early decades of the 
twentieth century the cotton mill industry in Bombay was beginning to shift 
from export of yarn to the far-east (particularly China) to production of yarn 
and cloth for the domestic market.  Also other textile centres in the interior 
areas, such as Ahmedabd, Cawnpore and Coimbatore, which grew faster 
than Bombay in this period, produced yarn and cloth mainly for the 
48
domestic market.  Further, as the textile industry in India grew due to rapid 
import substitution, it began to pick up an increasing proportion of the 
domestic raw cotton production.  The growing inward orientation was also 
a result of the traditional export oriented industries like jute stagnating in 
this period, while the domestic market oriented industries like cotton 
textiles, sugar and iron and steel registering relatively quicker growth 
49
rates.
Third, reflecting the changes discussed above, India's total volume of 
th
international trade, which had grown stupendously in the 19  century, when 
India became a typical outward oriented colonial economy, began to 
decline after World War I. Simultaneously, her internal trade began to grow, 
in some areas quite dramatically.  For example, between 1920 and 1939, the 
volume of internal trade in sugar increased by three times, in cotton piece 
goods, iron and steel, raw hide and skins and cement (1933 to 1939) it nearly 
doubled and in tanned hides and skins and leather it increased  by eight 
50
times.  It may be noted that the spurt in Indian industrial growth in this 
period was not linked to growth in international trade (one of the so called 
benefits of colonial rule, see f.n. 38) but to growth in internal trade.
Fourth, there occurred in this period a rapid shift of traditional 'pre-
capitalist' accumulations in trade, usury and landlordism to industry, again 
46 
See A. K. Bagchi, Private Investment…, Chs. 3, 7 and 9-14; Rajat Ray, Industrialization in India, 
Delhi,1979,pp.145 ff., 161 ff. And 196 ff.; B.R. Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-47, 
London, 1979, pp. 31-32 and Subramanian and Homfray, Recent Social and Economic Trends in India, 
New Delhi, 1946, pp.48-49 and 6-8.
47
 A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment…, Pp.440-41.
48
 A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment…, Chs. 3 and 7.
49
  Ibid., pp.83ff. and 433 ff.
50
Subramanian and Homfray, op. cit., P.51.
Before I do a critique of the colonial view of this period I shall, however, 
first take a detour and in some detail enumerate what the positive 
developments that occurred in this period were and then go on to show how 
these developments were not a result of colonialism or of a process of 
decolonization.
First, it is generally undisputed that a major development in the Indian 
colonial economy in the twentieth century was the initiation of a rapid phase 
of import substitution in most of the major consumer goods industries and 
certain intermediate and capital goods industries like textiles, sugar, 
matches, soap, cement, paper, glass, sulphuric acid and other basic 
46
chemicals, magnesium chloride, tinplate, and iron and steel.  (See table 1). 
This process, a reversal of the general nineteenth century colonial trend 
 
began in the early twentieth century, picked up by the First World War and 
Table I 
Sea-Borne Imports Into British India, 1900-1945
Source: Columns II, III and IV from S. Subramanian and P.W.R. Homfray, Recent Social  
and Economic Trends in India, Government of India, New Delhi ,1946, pp.48-49 and 6-8. 
Column 1 from A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment…op.cit., pp.238, 295 and 354.
a  See Rajat Ray, Industrialization in India, Delhi, 1979, p.138.  By 1937 India had started 
exporting sugar.
Note:   Up to 1936-37, figures included Burma.
I II III IV
1900-1 1920-21 1936-37 1944-45
Cotton Piece-goods 2003 1510 764 5
(million yards)
Sugar (thousand - 344 23 nil
tons (net imports-17)a
Soap (thousand cwt. - 313 48 3
Matches (thousand - 12399 55 During war imports
gross boxes (By 1938-39, imports rise due to
95% of total shortages. No figures
consumption met  available for 1944-45.
indigenously)
Cement (thousand tons) 165 131 51 5
[1914] [1940-41] Insignif icant in 1944-45,
being 1/5 of 1940-41 in value terms
at current prices.
Paper & Pasteboard 7,30 3,94 26.1
(Rs. Lakhs)
Iron and Steel (thousand 286 712 363 87
tons)
15 16
reversing the earlier pattern of such accumulations being diverted to 
landlordism a process of 're-feudalisation'.  While many of the princes 
financed big industry, a lot of trading-usury capital went into small 
51
enterprises.  This shift occurred partially because the two world wars and 
the Depression (as well as the fall in world demand for Indian primary 
products) reduced the traditional opportunities for investment in trade, 
indigenous banking, usury and landlordism. The same factors combined 
with the fact that the colonial state was forced to raise tariff duties on 
imports created opportunities for indigenous industrial investment (more 
on this later).
Fifth, as compared to the pre-World War I period, in the post-war period 
upto 1945 there was a gradual but consistent shift in the pattern of foreign 
trade with the proportion of manufactured goods in total exports showing a 
significant increase and in total imports showing an even more significant 
decrease. Conversely, the proportion of raw materials in total exports 
showed a definite decrease and the proportion of raw materials and capital 
goods (as opposed to consumer goods) in total imports showed a 
52
comparative increase.  There was here a tendency, however hesitant, 
towards the reversal of India's traditional colonial pattern of foreign trade, 
though the pattern still remained largely colonial till independence.   The 
example of sugar illustrates aspects of the new tendency.  The import of 
sugar (a manufactured consumer good) fell dramatically in the inter-war 
period leading to the commencement of exports by 1937 (see table 1).  On 
the other hand, the value of imports of sugar machinery shot up from Rs. 
53
1.75 m. in 1920-21 to Rs. 87 m. in 1932-33, at constant prices.
54
Sixth, contrary to traditional belief,  the actual net inflow of foreign 
capital to India was never very large and virtually insignificant in the form 
of industrial investments. Most foreign capital in the twentieth century 
came in the form of loans to meet the balance of payment deficits caused in 
no small measure by unilateral transfers made to the metropolis in the form 
of home-charges and debt servicing or interest charges and dividends 
accruing due to earlier foreign loans and investments. In fact,  if one pitted 
outflows on current account due to interest, dividends and home charges 
against net inflow due to foreign borrowing on the capital accounts, one 
would find that there was an outflow of capital from India virtually 
55
throughout the colonial period  and certainly since World War I.   However, 
even if one considers only the flows in the capital account, then also it is 
evident that foreign capital inflow fell off after the spurt of the early 1920s, 
and, by the early 1930s, Indian repayments and repatriation of foreign debt 
and earlier foreign investments exceeded fresh investments, i.e., there was a 
56
net outflow of foreign capital.  The process of repatriation which began in 
the early '30s picked up after 1935, and, with the onset of World War II, both 
repatriation of sterling public debt and retirement of private foreign loans 
57
and investment increased rapidly.
In fact, during World War II, when Britain made large war purchases in 
India, India ceased to be a debtor country and by 1946 had accumulated as 
credit against  Britain a whopping sterling balance of nearly Rs. 17,000 
million. Further, the dependence on the London money market for Indian 
government borrowing was also reduced dramatically after having peaked 
in the mid-1930s. While in 1934 sterling debt (or external debt) represented 
nearly 43 per cent of India's total public debt, by 1945 sterling debt 
accounted for only 4 per cent, i.e., 96 per cent of the public debt was raised 
58
internally.
Further, for a variety of reasons, areas where traditional foreign capital 
(European controlled business in India where a large part of the investments 
were internally raised) dominated, e.g., plantations, jute and foreign trade, 
underwent a relative stagnation after the First World War.  Also, a dual 
process of repatriation of foreign capital from these sectors and of 
59
Indianisation of ownership (and gradually control) in them set in.  On the 
other hand, the intrusion of the new type of foreign capital in the form of 
direct investments by multinational corporations during the twenties and 
60
thirties, remained very small till independence,  especially when compared 
to the rapid growth of indigenous enterprise in this period.  For example, 
between 1921 and 1938 the net foreign industrial investment was worth £ 
17 m., while the new investment in Indian industry was estimated to be £ 
61
144 m.  Also, between 1914-1947 the paid up capital of rupee companies 
(or companies registered in India) grew more than twice as fast as the 
increase in the paid up capital of sterling companies.  In fact between 1929 
and 1947 the paid up capital of rupee companies doubled while that of 
51
 See, e.g., A.I.Levkovsky, Capitalism in India, Delhi, 1966, pp.233 ff. and 319.
52 
See R.L. Varshney, “Foreign Trade”, in V.B. Singh, ed., Economic History of India, 1857 -1856, 
Bombay, 1965; Subramanian and Homfray, op. cit., p.47; B.R. Tomlinson, op.  cit., p.31
53
A.K.Bagchi, Private Investment…, table 12.2, p.367.
54 
It was assumed that imperialism of the third stage necessarily meant massive foreign investment in the 
colonies.  See, e.g., R.P. Dutt, India Today, (second Indian edition), Calcutta, 1970, ch.6.
55 
See A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment…, p.160 and A.K. Bannerji, India's Balance of Payments: 
Estimates of Current and Capital Accounts from 1921-22 to1938-39, Bombay, 1963, pp.195 and 200.
56
A.K. Bannerji, Ibid.
57 
Ibid. and Michael Kidron, Foreign Investment in India, London, 1965, pp.53 ff.
58 
See B.R. Tomlinson, op. cit., p.155 and Subramanian and Homfray, op.cit., Table XX, p.75.
59 
Kidron, op. cit., pp. 10-11 and 40 ff.
60 
Some scholars sometimes greatly exaggerate their role, seeing in them the ushering in of 'dependent 
capitalism'.  See, A.K. Bagchi, “Foreign Capital…,” op. cit. However the balance of payment figures of 
this period do not suggest any massive inflow of foreign direct investment.  See, e.g., A.K. Bannerji, 
op.cit., pp. 195, 200 etc.  As Rajat Ray put it, “As a matter of fact the entry of multi-nationals did not 
bring any appreciable addition to the level of investment”. op.cit., p.274
61 
B.R. Tomlinson, op. cit., pp.48-49.
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sterling companies stagnated showing an actual decline after the peak 
62
reached in 1932-33.  Foreign direct investments, however, did increase 
considerably after independence but they were kept under strict control and 
were not allowed to acquire a dominant position either in the overall 
63
economy or in most of the critical sectors of the economy.
Last, between 1914 and 1947, the Indian capitalist class, through a 
process of economic and political struggle, and taking advantage of the two 
64
wars and the Great Depression  as well as the specific crisis faced by British 
imperialism during these years, was able to significantly increase its hold 
over the Indian economy vis-à-vis foreign capital.  This was achieved 
chiefly through the following three processes: (a) by entering new areas 
almost exclusively and accounting for the overwhelming proportion of the 
new investments made after the 1920s, e.g., in sugar, cement, paper, heavy 
65
chemicals, iron and steel, etc.,  (b) by edging out or encroaching upon in 
greater or smaller degree the various traditional areas of European influence 
and dominance, e.g., banking, life-insurance, jute, textiles, partially 
66
shipping, foreign trade, coal, and tea,  (c) through a faster growth, in terms 
of investment and output, in economic sectors and geographical regions 
where Indian capital dominated, as opposed to those where European 
interests were dominant, e.g., cotton vs. jute, Bombay and other interior 
regions vs. Bengal and the metropolitan centres, home market-oriented 
industries vs. export-oriented industries like jute, plantations, etc., internal 
67
trade vs. foreign trade, and so on.
Thus before independence itself Indian capital had acquired 
considerable control over the domestic market. Rough estimates suggest 
that about 72-73 per cent of the domestic market was controlled by 
indigenous enterprise at the eve of independence. In the financial sphere 
also, where, earlier, European capital was supreme, the Indian capitalists 
made massive inroads.  While in 1914 foreign banks held 70 per cent of the 
deposits, by 1937 they held 57 per cent, and by 1947 a mere 17 per cent, i.e., 
68
83 per cent of the deposits were in Indian banks.
The various factors listed above suggest that what are considered to be 
some of the typical disarticulating features of an extroverted colonial 
economy were, to an extent, however hesitatingly, getting reversed, even 
within the overarching colonial structure. First, there was a growing 
tendency towards surplus value being appropriated through extended 
reproduction in the colony, and it was being accumulated and invested by an 
independent indigenous bourgeoisie, albeit within the constraints of a 
colonial economy. Second, there was a growing tendency towards 
indigenous industry being articulated with indigenous agriculture and the 
home market.  Thus the typical colonial feature of the colony's agriculture 
and its home market being articulated with metropolitan industry was 
showing a decline. Third, the hold of foreign capital was declining; and the 
indigenous bourgeoisie had gradually acquired a dominating position in the 
indigenous production sphere as well as in the home market.  Last, the 
colonial economy, like the indigenous bourgeoisie, had acquired a minimal 
strength and bargaining position vis-à-vis the metropolitan centre. For 
example, the economy instead of being weighed down by a huge debt 
enjoyed large foreign exchange balances by the end of W.W. II, and the 
colonial bourgeoisie was able to bargain effectively while associating with 
69
foreign capital in setting up enterprises,  or while negotiating trade 
70
agreements with Britain.
IV
The question now was: how to understand these positive changes? As 
mentioned earlier the colonial view was to see these changes as the 
beneficial result of colonialism or as the result of imperialism voluntarily 
pulling out. Colonial scholars have focused on the increasing import 
substitution in consumer goods industry in India (see Table 1) and the sharp 
decline in the British market in India, particularly in cotton textiles, to 
basically argue that Britain was now 'surrendering' its interests in India in 
favour of Indian industrial interests. The 1919 'Fiscal Autonomy 
71
Convention' was described as “a British self-denying ordinance”  which 
led to the “deliberate surrender of the largest export market in the world for 
72
a staple British manufacture.”  The fact that in the changed circumstances 
since the First World War India was able to achieve a somewhat better 
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bargain in the trade agreements of the 1930s (the Ottawa Agreement, 1932, 
the Mody-Lees Pact, 1934 and the Indo-British Trade Agreements of 1935 
and 1939), compared to the total surrender to British industrial and financial 
interests earlier, was interpreted as “the clever and powerful Indians 
(having) forced a disadvantageous trade treaty upon the weak and inept 
73
English.”  The 1939 agreement was described by Drummond as: “a 
'capitulation' -the sort of thing which Marxists tell us the evil imperialist 
Western governments force on the weak and helpless countries of the third 
World. But in this case, as at Ottawa...it was Britain who had capitulated, 
sacrificing most of her preferential advantages.... The reader is left to ask 
74
himself who was exploiting whom.” 
It was further argued that not only was Britain not exploiting India but it 
75
was actually encouraging Indian industrialization.  The fact that India still 
did not industrialize was because the Indian entrepreneur was incapable of 
taking advantage of the government initiative, it was just not upto taking on 
76
the immense challenge.
Also, somewhat like what Tirthankar Roy was to echo later, Dewey 
accused Marxists and nationalists of being simplistic and indulging in “a 
77
conspiracy theory of imperialist exploitation”.  He accused them of 
ascribing “Indian tariff policy to a single dominant determinant, principally 
the Lancashire cotton lobby…” and not recognizing the “remarkable 
metamorphosis” that had occurred since the First World War, where “the 
power-struggles within the India Office and the Government of India were 
resolved in favour of factions allied with the Bombay mill owners, while the 
factions allied with Lancashire were reduced to virtual impotence.” It was 
said, “in the 1870s the Secretary of State allied with Lancashire against the 
Government of India, while in the years after 1917 the Government of India 
aligned itself with Indian nationalists against the India Office….” In their 
battle with the Secretary of State the Government of India's “alliance with 
the nominal nationalist enemies” proved useful as did “the public opinion 
78
they helped manufacture” and the “upsurge of political unrest in India.”   It 
seems some 'manufactured' political unrest by the 'nominal nationalist 
enemies' was still necessary despite the assertion that “an important 
attribute of sovereignty had passed from England to India, twenty-five years 
79
before independence”.  A.D.D. Gordon argued a similar position saying 
that the Government of India was influenced by the Home government on 
the one hand and the fiscal demands of the local business interests on the 
other, with the government of India increasingly giving in to the latter, 
'nurturing' Indian industrialists rather than industrialists of Britain. 
Subsequent events, it was claimed, were to “illustrate this point” as with the 
“granting of independence” in 1947, manufacturing industry was to grow 
80
from “strength to strength”.  Evident again is the tendency to see continuity 
between developments since the First World War and those after 
independence and the failure to understand the decisive structural break that 
1947 represented in the political economy of the colonial situation in India.
While all this is bad economic history it is even worse political history. 
It goes one step further backwards from the so called “Cambridge School”, 
which saw Indian nationalism as a 'tamasha' 'manufactured' by the Indian 
th
elite, and argues the early 19  century Whig or liberal imperialist position, 
which saw the role of British rule as gradually training Indians for self-
81
government.  It was now the Government of India which was helping to 
'manufacture' nationalist opposition! The colonial people are robbed even 
of their own liberation struggle. With elements of 'sovereignty' already 
being passed on to India with Government help one is left wondering what 
the Gandhian mass movement phase of the Indian national movement, 
between World War I and 1947, costing tens of thousands of lives and 
82
involving untold sacrifices by millions, was all about.
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VIn my understanding, there is a completely different explanation for the 
developments in the twentieth century, particularly between World War I 
and 1947.  Instead of decolonisation, what this period witnessed was not 
only the continuation of colonial exploitation (though in an altered form) 
but its blatant intensification in many respects at great cost to the Indian 
economy and its people.
Britain did not after World War I abandon its most important market for 
th
textiles in India, so ruthlessly captured in the 19  century, as a result of their 
 
now giving in to Indian industrial interests or  merely due to Indian 
nationalist pressure. Britain was forced to concede substantially her 
imperial industrial interest in the colonial market in favour of imperial 
financial interest, i.e., using the colony as a source of capital through 
unrequited remittance or 'drain'. It was a switch from one imperial interest 
to another, not a switch from imperial to Indian national interest.
The tussle between the two imperial interests had already surfaced by 
th
the late 19  century when the Government of India was facing some 
difficulty in raising the revenue necessary for meeting the sterling 
83
remittance requirements.  The Government of India, unable economically 
and politically to raise the required revenue from any other source like land 
revenue, salt tax, etc., was keen to levy some revenue duties on Indian 
imports (not protective duties) which the Secretary of State under pressure 
from British textile manufacturing interests was adamant in not allowing. It 
is important to note that Government of India was not bending to national 
interest but was only trying to facilitate remittance and 'drain', a critical 
imperial financial interest. Eventually, in the 1890s the dilemma was 
resolved, expectedly at India's cost, by levying revenue duties on imports 
along with countervailing excise duties of the same amount on Indian 
manufacture of textiles to avoid even a semblance of any protection to 
Indian industry.
The dilemma of adjusting the two imperial interests, of finance and 
th
industry, followed a somewhat different trajectory in the 20  century, 
particularly since 1914. British financial demands on India increased 
84
manifold since W.W. I. For example, Home Charges  increased from 
approximately £ 20 million in 1913-14 to £ 32 million in 1924-25.  Military 
 
expenditure doubled from £ 5 million to £ 10 million and interest charges on 
external public debt increased from about £ 6 million to £ 14.3 million 
85
between 1913-14 and 1934-5.   In 1917 India supplied goods worth £ 100 
          
million without any payment and in 1918 decided to make another gift of  
 86
£ 45 million to the British war effort.  During World War II defence 
expenditure increased by over nine times, from about Rs. 50 crores in 1939-
40 to Rs. 458 crores in 1944.  The proportion of the total expenditure of the 
Central Government accounted for by the Defence Services (an expenditure 
Tirthankar Roy fully approves)  was about 55 per cent in 1920-21 rising to 75 
87
per cent by the end of World War II.   Far from decolonizing, retaining India 
had become even more critical for Britain.
The huge rise in India's sterling 'obligations' or 'commitments' (often 
88
used as an euphemism for, if not denial of drain)   or the 'external drain' 
required large increases in the revenues raised by Government of India or 
the 'internal drain' in order to pay for the external drain. Again, the only 
possible area where revenue could be increased substantially was customs 
revenue, which primarily meant import duties. Thus between 1901-5 and 
1936-7 while the total revenue raised by Government of India more than 
doubled, customs alone met about 72 per cent of the increase in total 
revenue.  Customs which had overtaken land revenue as the principal 
source of revenue by 1921-25 was thus critical in the maintenance of the 
rapidly increasing remittances of the Government of India on account of 
89
home charges, military expenditure, etc.
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The import duties on cotton goods had gone up from 3.5 per cent in the 
1890s to 25 per cent for British cotton goods in 1931. (Duty on non-British, 
mainly Japanese goods had risen to 75 per cent by 1933). The 
countervailing   excise of 3.5 per cent levied in 1896 however could not be 
increased in the changed political circumstances with a powerful anti-
imperialist mass movement having come up in the meantime. Significantly, 
this change in scenario was not seen by the British government as the 
surrender of imperial interest, even if that may have been the view of some 
imperialist scholars. Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India, quite 
conscious of the crucial role played by import duties in maintaining 
imperial interests, argued against the Lancashire agitation for removal of 
cotton duties. Apart from the “disastrous” political consequences such a 
course of action would produce, he urged that it must be recognized that 
“the present level of tariff on British cotton goods” was necessary for 
revenue purposes for “without this revenue India would be unable to 
discharge its financial obligations in this country and provide for military 
90
expenditure.”
Maintenance of remittance from India to Britain at any cost became the 
centre piece of British economic policy in this period for yet another reason.  
Britain, having lost its industrial supremacy in the world (first in consumer 
th
goods and later in capital goods as well) by the end of  the 19  century and 
th
particularly by the beginning of the 20  century, was increasingly emerging 
as the major financial centre of the world with the pound sterling as its 
91 
foundation - a position that Britain was able to maintain till W.W.II to a  
large extent with the aid of India, by manipulating blatantly her currency, 
exchange and budgetary and financial policy.
It is small wonder, then, that finance was one portfolio the British 
refused to part with (even in the limited sense of appointing an Indian of 
their choice to the Viceroy's Executive Council) till the very end, i.e., till the 
formation of the Interim Government in 1946.  Several other economic 
portfolios such as those of commerce, industry, planning and development, 
and supply were given to Indian members long before that. Even when the 
colonial Government set up the Reserve Bank of India in 1935, it was barely 
given any autonomy, with the British government insisting on “the last 
word” on financial matters. The bank, seen as an instrument for 
safeguarding imperial financial interests, was not to be allowed to be 
misused by Indians who “like a spoilt, willful, naughty child” would 
92
instantly want to use it to demand financial responsibility.
An India Office document of December 1930, marked 'secret' and 
called “The Position of the Secretary of State in Relation to Indian 
93  
Finance,” brings out clearly some of the reasons for the crucial importance 
attached to the issue of finance by the British.  It was stated that about 60 per 
cent of the Indian Government's budget, i.e., about £60 million out of £100 
million, was absorbed by military expenditure, sterling debt charges and 
liabilities in respect of salaries and pensions for officials for which the 
Secretary of State was responsible. Of this, defence expenditure alone 
94 
absorbed 45 per cent of the central revenues.  When such a large proportion 
of the revenue was earmarked for charges for which the Secretary of State 
was responsible, it was pointed out that “it is hardly open to doubt that 
Parliament should retain the power to secure that its obligations are duly 
95
honoured”.  Since the “revenues from which these commitments must be 
met are collected in rupees”, and the 'commitments' were in sterling, it was 
“incumbent” upon the Secretary of State to see “that currency and exchange 
are being so managed” as to “permit of the remittances of the requisite funds 
from India to London”.  Also, he had to ensure that the revenue and 
96
expenditure of the Government of India were balanced.  In other words, the 
Secretary of State needed the “power to impose on the Indian Executive 
such measures as are needed to provide the funds and to facilitate their 
97
transfer… from India to London.  Some decolonization!
Before I go on to outline other aspects of the fiscal and monetary policy 
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followed by Britain in this period to meet its growing imperial financial 
interests, it must be noted that the rising tariffs did not mean that Britain was 
ready to withdraw from trying to maintain its industrial interest in the 
colonial market, i.e., decolonize even in this limited sense. While it is true 
that British exports to India were shrinking rapidly  since W.W.I, (except in 
chemicals where they increased) India still remained, as late as 1938, the 
largest single market for British exports of cotton piece-goods as it did for 
98
general machinery and other items.  The Indian market though shrinking 
was thus far from redundant, on the contrary its importance increased as 
British share in world trade kept declining. Basudev Chatterjee has ably 
demonstrated how Lancashire was desperate to hang on to the Indian 
market and Britain tried to ensure that it did, as much as the new 
99
circumstances would permit.  By introducing the principle of Imperial 
Preference at Ottawa and through the various trade agreements of the 1930s 
Britain was making a last ditch effort to retain as much of the Indian market 
as was possible at a time when Britain was no longer able to compete 
effectively with other countries in various commodities, such as Japan in 
cotton textiles. There were however limits to how much imperial preference 
could be given to British goods as it could lead to retaliation by other 
countries, which in turn would affect Indian exports. This could not be 
permitted as India had to generate an export surplus at any cost so that the 
smooth flow of remittance to Britain could be sustained as imperial 
100
financial interests would not countenance any interruption in that process.
It is to ensure that India remained a constant source of capital to Britain 
through remittances, during a period when Britain just flitted from one 
crisis to the other (especially the two world wars and the depression), that 
the most gross use of imperial authority was made to turn the instruments of 
economic policy in her favour and against Indian interest.
To the great agitation of Indian nationalist opinion, the colonial 
government, in order to “manage” the currency and exchange in such a 
manner that the process of raising revenue in India and its remittance to 
Britain remained undisturbed, constantly followed a deflationary policy in 
India, including by severely contracting the currency in circulation, in order 
to push up the exchange value of the Rupee which it tried to keep at 1s. 6d. 
by virtual decree. A fiscal and monetary deflationary policy including 
severe cuts in Government capital expenditure was followed even during 
101
the Depression years, severely aggravating its negative consequences.
With the onset of the Great Depression, the situation in India changed 
drastically. World prices, especially those of primary produce, plummeted 
and India's export earnings collapsed. With agricultural prices being so low, 
102 
the Government was unable to collect full revenue. Also, with the fall in 
export earnings, there was great difficulty in securing remittance to meet 
103
India's sterling obligations or the Home Charges.  With both revenue and 
remittance in jeopardy, the colonial Government was in the throes of a 
104
major financial crisis. Under continuous pressure from London,  the 
Government of India sought to ease remittance by resorting to severe 
deflation, contracting currency repeatedly, causing havoc in the Indian 
economy, especially in the money market.
A total breakdown of the remittance mechanism was averted by the 
massive export of gold from India that the government encouraged in this 
period.  The gold exports were crucial in compensating for the drastic drop 
105
in India's export surplus on commodity transactions.  Between 1931-32 
and 1938-39, on an average, more than half (about 55 per cent) of the total 
visible (positive) balance of trade (i.e. balance of transactions in 
merchandise and treasure) was met through the net exports of treasure, with 
the exports of gold increasing sharply in years when the commodity balance 
of trade was particularly low.  For example, in 1932-33, gold exports 
106
constituted about 95 per cent of the total visible positive balance of trade.  
Clearly remittance had to be maintained at all costs, if the export surplus in 
commodities (necessary to convert the rupee revenues into remittance) fell 
short it was made up through export of gold.
Apart from the role of gold exports in India's maintaining a smooth flow 
of remittance of the 'sterling obligations' or the Home Charges, as well as, 
the other invisibles such as profits, dividends and interests earned on 
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foreign investments, it played another critical role for British interests at 
home.  At a time when Britain was facing a balance of payment crisis it 
played a major part in strengthening the value of sterling vis-à-vis gold and 
107
other currencies.
It was small wonder then that the gold export from India was one issue 
on which the British home government remained very firm, though many 
countries including Britain were following an opposite strategy themselves.  
It appears that the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Osborne Smith, 
had to resign partially because of his taking a position on this question 
which was far too independent of the India Office and the Finance 
Department.  He took a position similar to the nationalist demand for 
108
devaluation of the rupee to prevent outflow of hoarded gold from India.
However the blatant and cynical manner in which Britain used Indian 
finances for its own benefit during the Second World War was breathtaking 
in its audacity. It puts paid to any notion of imperialism withdrawing or 
decolonisation having occurred till the bitter end of colonial rule. Britain 
took massive forced loans from India (popularly called the Sterling 
Balance) of about Rs.17,000 million (estimated at seventeen times the 
annual revenue of the Government of India and one-fifth of Britain's gross 
109
national product in 1947)   at a time when over three million Indians died 
of famine! 
The Sterling Balances got accumulated as a result of the “large 
purchases of goods and services…made by the British Government, in 
India”, against sterling bills or securities placed in reserve in London.  For 
these large exports of goods and services, India, thus, received no “tangible 
110
quid pro quo” other than “I.O.U.s of His Majesty's Government”.  The 
procedure was similar to that adopted during World War I  the Reserve Bank 
of India expanded currency or issued notes against its sterling holdings held 
111
in reserve in London to pay for the British war purchases in India.  The 
rapid expansion of currency that occurred as a result (the total notes issued 
increased by nearly four times between 1939 and 1944) combined with the 
fact that large quantities of goods and services were made available to 
England for which no goods or services came back to India in  return, led to 
112
severe shortages and a runaway inflation.  What was shocking was that 
this policy could be pursued at a time when famine conditions prevailed in 
India. To cap it all, after the War was over, Britain made a serious bid 
towards defaulting on repayment of the loans raised at such tremendous 
113
cost to India.
The Second World War also saw British colonialism deny India yet 
another opportunity to make an industrial breakthrough an opportunity 
seized by the 'White' colonies. Indian entrepreneurs, who had already in the 
inter-war years shattered the bogey of India facing a lack of capital or 
entrepreneurship, or of Indian capital being  'shy' and unwilling to take 
risks, by growing rapidly, much faster than foreign capital in India and 
114
venturing into new areas,  were poised for a major industrial push during 
the Second World War. The persistent efforts of Indian entrepreneurs to 
enter frontier areas of industry in India such as automobile, aircraft and 
locomotive manufacture, shipbuilding, manufacture of armaments, 
engineering goods, machine tools, etc., were smothered by the colonial 
state using fiscal, monetary and other instruments of state policy such as the 
'Capital Issues Control', all in the name of the “War effort,” but in actuality 
in deference to imperial interests and even the interest of the white 
115
colonies.
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VI
To return to the question of the positive 'non-colonial' type of 
developments since W.W. I listed in section III, clearly they were not the 
result of any process of decolonization because, as I argue above, there was 
no such process occurring. Neither were these developments the result of 
colonialism itself. They were the product of space wrenched from it. As I 
116
have argued earlier  it is easily demonstrable that all the developments 
listed above, occurred (to list some of the causes) either (a) as a result of  the 
struggle,  political and economic, against imperialism, whether through the 
national movement, legislative assemblies, business chambers or directly 
117
by entrepreneurs, as most demonstrably in the case of shipping,  or (b) 
when the grip of imperialism weakened or loosened due to world factors 
autonomous of the logic of the colonial system in the colony, such as the 
118
World Wars and the Great Depression,  or (c) when the principal 
metropolis Britain, lost out in competition to  other metropolitan centres 
and preferred to permit indigenous enterprise in the colony to grow rather 
than allow other foreign powers to capture the colonial market, e.g., 
protection to cotton, iron and steel, matches and sugar was related 
respectively, to competition from Japan, Belgium and Germany, Sweden, 
119
and Java, a Dutch colony,  or (d) due to the inner contradictions of 
colonialism itself, e.g., the increasing need for revenue from the colony to 
meet imperial financial interests could no more be met from a by now 
stagnating or even declining agriculture but had to be met through revenue 
tariffs on imports, which provided indigenous manufacture certain amount 
120
of protection against imperial industrial interests.    In other words, the 
th
specific non-colonial type of developments in the 20  century occurred not 
as a result of colonialism but in spite of or in opposition to it.
The very limited growth of the positive, non-colonial developments 
was occurring in an embryonic form in the hostile womb of colonialism 
whose continuation was making the birth of capitalism in India more and 
more difficult. The structural distortions created by colonialism made the 
future transition to self-sustained growth much more difficult.  It required 
the overthrow of colonialism, and the 'un-structuring' of the colonial 
structure for India to start its attempt to build independent capitalism after 
colonialism for nearly two hundred years ravaged its economy and society 
and deprived it of the opportunity of participating in the process of modern 
industrial transformation occurring in other parts of the world. Despite the 
post W.W.I positive developments the Indian economy till 1947 remained 
essentially backward and structurally colonial.  The Indian economy at 
independence was still basically dependent on a stagnating, low 
productivity, 'semi-feudal' agriculture with modern industry (in 1950) 
contributing a mere 6 to 8 per cent of the national income and (in 1951) 
121
employing 2.3 per cent of the labour force (in 1946).
What India inherited after two hundred years of colonial 'benevolence', 
which allegedly gave India the 'advantages' of 'commercialization', 
'exposure to the world market', 'transport and communication', 'a strong 
state', 'western scientific skills', etc., benefits that Tirthankar Roy could  
hardly stop listing, was a very sorry state of affairs indeed.
As Angus Maddison's monumental work shows, India was the largest 
economy of the world for the entire thousand years of the first millennium 
accounting for close to 30 per cent of the world's GDP. Till as late as the 
th
beginning of the 18  century India's was still the largest economy with 
about 25 per cent of the world's GDP, more than eight times that of the 
United Kingdom. The decline started soon after and at the end of nearly two 
hundred years of colonial rule (during which Tirthankar Roy claims 
122
“colonial India experienced positive economic growth”)  India's share had 
been reduced to a mere 4.2 per cent in 1950. It was a few decades before 
India could sufficiently shrug off the colonial legacy and begin to gradually 
123
claw her way back into improving her share of the global pie.
The impact of colonialism in human terms was traumatic and all too 
visible. At independence the average life expectancy was barely 30 years. 
The poor obviously died much younger. India was faced with acute food 
shortages creating near famine conditions repeatedly in different areas. The 
Bengal famine of 1943, just four years before the British left, claimed more 
124
than three million lives.  (A great tragedy which Tirthankar Roy 
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predictably underplays, putting the famine deaths only at “some half a 
million”, a figure much lower than even the official famine Inquiry 
125
Commission and  other government estimates.)  Between 1946-53 about 
14 million tons of food grains worth Rs.10,000 million had to be imported, 
seriously affecting India's planned development after independence. In 
1951, 84 percent of the people (92 percent women) were illiterate. The 
126
legacy of colonialism which Tirthankar Roy misjudged so completely  
was anticipated by the poet Rabindranath Tagore, shortly before his death in 
127
1941, in his inimitable way:
The wheels of fate will some day compel the English to give up their Indian Empire. 
What kind of India will they leave behind, what stark misery? When the stream of their 
centuries' administration runs dry at last, what a waste of mud and filth will they leave 
behind them. 
VII
The growth that India witnessed after independence was not all about 
carrying on the 'good' work started during colonialism. It was a product of a 
structural break painstakingly crafted through a multi pronged planned 
effort - an unique effort of trying to industrialize and build capitalism with 
democracy and civil liberties. Jawaharlal Nehru and other leaders were 
deeply aware that India was experimenting with a hitherto uncharted path as 
none of the industrialized countries of the world had democracy and civil 
liberties during the initial period of transition to capitalism and 
industrialization. I have evaluated elsewhere the nature of this stupendous 
128
effort since independence.  I will only outline here a brief comparison of 
some of the features of the colonial period, especially the period of so called 
decolonisation and positive growth since World War I with those of the 
period after independence. This may help underline the enormity of the 
break required, and to a considerable extent achieved.
The growth of per capita income in India in the colonial period was 
either zero or very low, remaining way below that of the independent 
countries of Europe, USA and Japan between 1820 and 1913. See table 2. In 
the last decades of colonial rule after colonialism had  its full impact, the per 
capita income in India actually declined at an annual rate of -0.22 per cent 
129 
between 1913- 1950.  After independence, on the other hand, it grew at 1.4 
per cent in the first couple of decades (about 3 times faster than the best 
phase, 1870-1913, under colonialism) and much faster at 3.01 per cent in 
the next 30 years, 1973-2001 (a rate considerably higher than that achieved 
130
by West Europe,  USA or Japan) and in the last four years (2003-4 to 2006-
7) at an astounding 7 per cent (it was over 8 per cent in 2006-7) comparable 
to the explosive rates achieved by Japan (though in very special 
131 
circumstances) between 1950-73.
TABLE 2
Rate of Growth of per capita GDP
(Annual average compound growth rates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
* per capita net national product
Source: Column 1 to 5 from Angus Maddison, op. cit., Table 8b, p. 643. Column 6 is based on 
Economic Survey, 2006-07, Government of India, New Delhi 2007, and Aditya Mukherjee, 
“Indian Economy in the New Millennium,” in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee and 
Aditya Mukherjee, India Since Independence, Penguin, Delhi, forthcoming, 2008. 
Similarly, the colonial period saw a process of de-industrialisation 
where traditional industry was largely destroyed and modern industry grew 
very slowly. Despite the growth of modern industry since W.W. I, at about 
3.8 per cent per annum, it contributed a mere 6 to 8 per cent of the national 
product in 1950,  having started from an extremely low level of 4 per cent of 
132
national product in 1913.  Moreover, modern industry was yet dominated 
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 1820-70 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-73 1973-2001 2001-2007 
France 1.01 1.45 1.12 4.04 1.71  
UK 1.26 1.01 0.93 2.42 1.86  
USA 1.34 1.82 1.61 2.45 1.86  
Japan 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14  
India 0.00 0.54 -0.22 1.40 3.01 5.65* 
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by consumer goods industry with a near total and debilitating dependence 
on the advanced countries for capital goods and technology. Contrast this 
with the period after independence. Industry during the first three plans 
(1951-65) grew at 7.1 per cent per annum. More important “the three-fold 
increase in aggregate index of industrial production between 1951 and 1969 
was the result of a 70 per cent increase in consumer good industries, a 
quadrupling of the intermediate goods production and a   ten-fold increase 
133
in the output of capital goods.”  This pattern of industrial development led 
to a structural transformation of the colonial legacy. From a situation where 
to make any capital investment, virtually the entire equipment had to be 
imported (in 1950, India met nearly 90 per cent of its needs of even machine 
tools through imports) the share of imported equipment in the total fixed 
investment in the form of equipment in India had come down to 43 per cent 
in 1960 and a mere 9 per cent in 1974, whereas the value of the fixed 
investment in India increased by about two and a half times over this period 
134
(1960-74).  This was a major achievement, and it considerably increased 
India's autonomy from the advanced countries in determining her own rate 
of capital accumulation or growth.
Agriculture, the largest sector of the Indian economy, was in a state of 
ruin under colonialism. Per-capita agricultural output actually fell at the rate 
of 0.72 per cent per year during 1911-1941. Per-capita food grains output 
fell even more sharply by 1.14 per cent per year, a 29 per cent fall over the 
135
period.   All crop yields per acre declined by 0.01 per cent per year between 
1891 -1946 and again food grain yields declined more rapidly by 0.18 per 
136
cent, and even more sharply by 0.44 per cent per year between 1921-46.  
No wonder the food shortages and famine conditions mentioned above.  
After independence, a combination of institutional changes (land reforms) 
and massive state sponsored technological change transformed this 
137
situation.  During the first three plans (leaving out 1965-66, a drought 
year), Indian agriculture grew at an annual rate of over 3 per cent, a growth 
rate more than eight times faster than the annual growth rate of 0.37 per cent 
achieved during the half a century (1891-1946) of the last phase of 
138
colonialism in India.  The Green Revolution in the late 1960s maintained a 
rate of growth ranging from about 2.5 to 3.5  per cent (primarily through 
139
increases in yield) till the mid 1990s  The Green Revolution areas like 
Punjab and Haryana did not have any continuities with trends in the colonial 
140
period as Tirthankar Roy, for example, argues.  Haryana was largely an 
extremely backward area in colonial times and even Punjab showed meager 
growth rates in terms of all-crop yields per acre of 0.36 per cent per annum 
between 1901-1941 by one estimate and of only 0.06 per cent between 
1906-7 and 1941-42 by another. The highest increases in yield seen in 
Punjab were in non-food crops of an average of 1 per cent per annum 
141
between 1891-1951.  In contrast the value productivity of eleven major 
crops in Punjab increased between 1950-51 and 1969-70 by 255 per cent, 
142
i.e., an average annual increase of more than 12.5 per cent.  The huge 
productivity difference certainly signifies a structural break.
Table 3
Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) as percentage of GDP, 
Public Expenditure at Current Prices and Public Expenditure as 
Percentage of GDP 1901-2006
(All figures are annual averages)
Source: Computed from Economic Survey 2006-07, Government of India, New Delhi, 
2007, Tables 1.4 and 1.5, S-6 to S-9.
* Goldsmith, op.cit., Table 1-10, p.20 and Table 2-9, p.80.
# Computed from Rajat K. Ray, Industrialisation in India, OUP, Delhi,1979, Table 40, 
p.257.
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GDCF as % of GDP 
Public Expenditure 
Rs. Crore 
(current prices) 
Share of Public 
Expenditure in
GDCF as % of GDP 
1901-1913 6.92* 75.4       (1925-30)#  
1914-1946 6.75* 41.7       (1930-38)#  
1950-1955 9.04 331.8 3.14 
1955-1960 13.3 769.6 5.62 
1960-1970 14.66 1912.1 6.96 
1970-1980 17.63 8003.4 8.19 
1980-1990 21.23 26416.9 9.98 
2004-2006 32.65   
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The rate of capital formation, the key to economic development, occurred at 
a very slow pace during the colonial period. India was in fact losing to 
Britain as drain or tribute an equal proportion, if not more, of what was 
invested in India. The drain has been variously calculated to be between 5 to 
143
10 per cent of her national income.  The average annual rate of capital 
formation between 1901 to 1913 was 6.92 per cent of GDP, falling to 6.75 
per cent between 1914-46 (see Table 3). Public expenditure, an important 
engine of capital formation in backward countries, declined sharply from 
Rs. 75.4 crores annually during 1925-1930 to Rs. 41.7 crores during the 
Depression years 1930-38, when the opposite needed to be done. The 
massive cut in government expenditure along with other deflationary fiscal 
and monetary policies greatly exacerbated the negative effects of the 
Depression on the Indian economy.
The contrast between the colonial and the post independence scenario is 
evident.  While public expenditure was low and declining during the last 
144
decades of colonial rule  the initial forty years of independence (1950-
1990) saw it rise by more than three times (see Table 3, column 2 and 3).  
Similarly, while the last fifty years or so of colonial rule (1901-1946) saw 
the gross capital formation in the economy hover around 6 to 7 per cent of 
GDP annually, the first fifty years after independence saw the rate of capital 
formation rise consistently and sharply, ending up at a rate of 33.8 per cent 
145
in 2005-06 about five times the colonial rate.
There was also a rapid per capita increase in the availability of some of 
the infrastructural and social benefits as they grew several times faster than 
the population immediately after independence. In 1965-66, as compared to 
1950-51, installed capacity of electricity was 4.5 times higher, number of 
town and villages electrified was 14 times higher, hospital beds 2.5 times 
higher, enrollment in schools was a little less than 3 times higher and very 
importantly admission capacity in technical education (engineering and 
technology) at the degree and diploma levels was higher by 6 and 8.5 times, 
respectively. This when population increased only by 37.3 per cent over the 
146
period.
Also, Jawaharlal Nehru and the early Indian planners were acutely 
aware of India's backwardness in science and technology (an area left 
consciously barren in the colonial period) and therefore made massive 
efforts to overcome this shortcoming. An unprecedented increase occurred 
in the educational opportunities in science and technology in the 
universities and institutes. National expenditure on scientific research and 
development kept growing rapidly with each plan. For example, it 
increased from Rs. 10 million in 1949 to Rs. 4.5 billion in 1977. Over 
roughly the same period the stock of India's scientific and technical 
manpower increased more than 12 times from 190 thousand to 2.32 million. 
A spectacular growth by any standards, a growth whose benefits India reaps 
147
today as the world moves towards a 'knowledge' society.
The quantum jump in investments, growth rates, improvements in 
health, education etc., listed above did not occur because of any dramatic 
change in India's “climatic risks,” “resource endowments,” “hunger for 
gold,” or tendency to “have sumptuous marriage feasts,” some of the causes 
 
listed by Tirthankar Roy for  the Indian economy stagnating in the colonial 
148
period.  They occurred because of the concerted effort to break away from 
the disabilities created by the colonial structure.
However despite the paradigmatic change since independence India is 
149
still faced with intolerable levels of poverty and backwardness.  Undoing 
the ravages of nearly two hundred years of colonialism was never going to 
be an easy task. What is certain, however, is that the answers to the future 
challenges would not lie in building on the continuities with colonialism but 
on the breaks.
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